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       In this research, I would liketo explore the experience of undergoing the limits 
       by reading Simone  Weil's thought about  'attention' and Paul  Standish's book 
       Beyond the  Self. First, the concept of  'attention' that I think best describes 
 Weil's thoughts will be discussed. Second, on the basis of  Weil's  'attention', I will 
       return to the argument about the distinction between limitsand limitations in 
      Beyond the Self. This may finally reveal the attitude of waitingthat Weil presents 
       as the consent to be nothing, which is made possible by directing out attention to 
      the limits. This attitude can also be deeply concerned with the virtue of humility 
       and the concept of receptiveness in Beyond the Self. 
PREFACE 
This study explores the concept of  'attention' in Simone Weil's works through a dialogue with 
Paul Standish's book Beyond the Sell 
 On Weil, people often say that there are two Simone Weils. This description points out that 
there is a crucial divergence between Weil's early works, when she is vigorously involved in the 
activity of trade unions and does not hesitate to profess herself as an atheist, and Weil's later 
works, when she leans toward the various mystical ideas and love of (and for) God. It may be 
shocking for us to see this change from Weil the atheist to Weil the mystic. Then, we are 
probably led to one question as follows: What is the turning point in her life? 
 This question, however, would prevent us from differentiating the apparent division between 
the two Simone Weils from her core issue. In other words, it is possible that to make 
assumptions about the two Simone Weils means failing to grasp the point of Weil's coherent 
issue which she approaches by staking her life on it. 
 What she is claimed to be attracted to throughout her life is the claim of  ` pourquoi (why/for 
 what)  ', which, for Weil, means the claim of nameless and miserable people whom no one can 
recognize in their ordinary daily lives. It never releases her interest. Therefore, many researchers 
recognize that the problem of  ` malheur (misfortune,  misery)  ' is a most important issue in Weil. 
They think of  ` malheur' as a key concept in understanding of Weil and often try to find a 
coherent basis common in both early Weil and later Weil's works. 
 In this paper, I basically agree with such style of study that I explain above, but it is not my
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position to directly dissolve the apparent severance in the two Simone Weils. My thesis is to 
explore the core issue of Weil in relation to the claim of  `pourquor and the concept of 
 `attention'  . Both of these have to do with the concept of  ` rnalheur'  . The former is the expression 
of it and the latter is the eyes of those who care about it. 
 In particular,  'attention' is thought to be a unique style of thought that penetrates the whole 
of Weil's thoughts. It is the eyes that can see what (and who) cannot be seen. In this sense, it 
has to do with the concept of ordinariness and creativeness. It is on these two concepts that I 
would like to establish the basis of my paper. 
 `Attention' is unusual because it can see  'what does not exist' (i.e. what cannot be seen in our 
ordinary daily life). In this sense,  ` rnalheur' is representative of  'what does not exist'. It brings 
us the experience to touch the extraordinariness. However, it is not extraordinary because it is far 
apart from our ordinary daily lives; on the contrary, experience of  ` malheur' is what enriches our 
ordinariness from inside. Metaphorically speaking, the extraordinariness is the seed planted in 
the ordinariness. I will discuss about this relation in the last section of this paper. 
 First, I will start to discuss the concept of  'attention' that I think describes Weil's thoughts 
directly. Weil says that the first person, who notices and talks to a nameless miserable man or 
woman on the roadside, has the eyes of attention. In other words, attention is not the ability of 
defending ourselves against enemies, but rather exposing ourselves to the other whom we cannot 
recognize easily. To put it another way, the eyes of attention are directed to the limits that 
separate us from what we cannot see. To describe this, Weil often quotes the metaphor of the 
Cave from Plato. As we have seen, we can interpret that there is the limit between inside and 
outside the Cave. The limit is rigid and it feels impossible for us to go beyond it. Weil says that 
to experience such limits is the experience of the impossibility. However, at the same time, it is 
also the experience of the relations as the bridge that enables us to endure the impossibility, or 
nothing. In addition to this, the limits, which show us the impossibility and nothing, are 
incompatible with the concept of the power and the utility. Such limits should not be made good 
use of something, especially of educational system. 
 Second, regarding this point, I will return to the argument about the distinction between limits 
and limitations in Beyond the Self. Later in this paper, I will discuss how we consider about the 
limitations that prevent us from going beyond. I wonder whether they should be regarded as 
something we should confront and overcome, or something we should abide by partly. Because 
my point is not revealing the vision of another world going beyond but showing the possibility 
of the experience of impossibility itself, I will examine how this point is discussed in Beyond the 
Self 
 That discussion may reveal the attitude of waiting that Weil presents as the consent to be 
nothing, which is achieved by directing our attention to the limits. This attitude is also deeply 
concerned with the virtue of humility and the concept of the receptiveness in Beyond the Self. 
This argument will lead us to reveal the meaning of reconsidering the possibility of education, 
which has to do with the concept of the ordinariness and creativeness.
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I. TWO VIEWS OF THE CONCEPT OF  'ATTENTION' IN SIMONE  WEIL 
In this section,  I will discuss the concept of  'attention' as an introduction to this paper by 
following two views. 
 (1) As the eyes toward the  'limit situation' 
   (2) As the experience of  'relation' 
As the Eyes Toward the Limit Situation 
In the first view, the concept of  'attention' is the attitude toward a limit situation. Karl 
Jaspers' usage of Grenzsituation (limit situation) is particularly practical in light of Weil's 
thought. Weil often invokes the metaphor of Plato's Cave in The Republic to describe such a 
limit  situation. It is usually considered that a limit separates the inside and outside of the Cave. 
The limit here is rigid: consequently, it seems impossible for us to go beyond it. Weil says that 
the experience of such a limit is an encounter with the impossible. In other words, the limit 
situation here is equal to the experience of the impossibility. 
 As examples of limit situations, Wed offers contemplation of beauty, torture without 
compensation, religion without faith in immortality, and so on. Initially, we might find no 
connection between these examples and the limit in the metaphor of the Cave. However, the 
beauty here, for example, exceeds our prospects. For that reason, we are often caught off guard 
by it. Everything would seem unlike the time before we encounter such beauty. That is just 
parallel to the contrast between consciousness and intellect of inside and outside the Cave. The 
distinction between gloom and brightness in the metaphor of the Cave reflects the distinction 
between the attitude toward contemplation of beauty and our ordinary vision. 
 Put another way, the limit implies the discontinuity which induces us to feel the impossibility 
of going beyond the limit. According to Weil, it presents a contradiction that confuses us, but it 
can be the important experience which opens up another possibility of a limit situation to us. 
Weil holds that it compels us to tear ourselves from our ordinary vision: our usual consciousness 
and understandings. 
 In order to realize this, we must wait on and tolerate the limit situation. According to Weil, 
what is necessary for us is neither a future-oriented attitude nor a past-oriented one. Recognizing 
such a limit means being receptive to the past as it was without expecting any compensation 
(Weil, 1979). We must abide by the present: the limits in front of us. This is exactly what is 
implied in the concept of  'attention'. Consequently,  'attention' includes not only the attitude of 
waiting for but also that of tolerating misery and agony. To put it another way,  'attention' 
comprises both senses of wish and misery. The attitude of waiting on shows a persistent wish 
and a tolerance of misery. 
 In this respect, Weil says that the person who first notices and talks to an anonymous 
miserable person by the roadside has the eyes of  'attention' (Weil, 1966). He can notice that 
person in the eyes of  'attention', because he shares the sense of misery with him: and 
nevertheless remains close to him without losing a wish. It is to acknowledge  `malheur',
 118 H. Ikeda 
although almost everyone cannot keep acknowledging in encountering with it. That is to say, 
 `attention' is not the ability of defending ourselves against enemies, but rather the experience of 
exposing ourselves to the other, who we cannot recognize easily. The eyes of  'attention' are 
directed to the limits that challenge the fixed and standing routine. 
As the Experience of  'Relation' 
This characteristic of  'attention' is deeply involved with the second view as well. As described 
previously, the experience of a limit situation means an encounter with impossibility. The point 
here is that it is also the experience of  'rapport'  (relation). The contradiction described above 
might seem incompatible with the concept of relation, for the contradiction can be converted into 
the collapse of relations. Nevertheless, Weil finds harmony and balance in the contradiction, 
which she describes by using the metaphor of 'pont' (bridge). 
 Weil describes such a relation as a  'bridge' on which we can tolerate the impossibility, or 
nothing. It is built over the limits and enables us to relate with something more than existence 
(i.e., nothing). Weil makes a clear distinction between  `existence' and  `reality'. Here, the 
impossibility or nothing falls into the  'reality'. It is similar to the distinction between 
consciousness and intellect of inside and outside the Cave: thus, the  `bridge' is particularly 
exceptional. 
 Weil finds such a 'bridge' in ancient Greek civilization, for instance. She regards ancient 
Greeks as special recipients of a revelation about an infinite distance separating  ` existence' and 
 `reality'. This distance shows the impossibility, or contradiction described previously. Weil 
directs her attention to it and tolerates the uneasiness and exhaustion that  ` attention' entails. Most 
important here is that the contradiction or limit situation itself also enables us to wait on 
persistently until someone's response arrives. In other words, she considers  'relation' a story that 
makes the impossible possible. 
 Rather than revealing a vision of a transcendent world, the intention for this research is to 
present the possibility of experience of the impossible itself. That is to say, the point is not after 
crossing the  'bridge', but just the midst of the  'bridge'. In Weil's thought, experiencing the 
impossible is regarded as equivalent to seeing through the relation. It represents the attitude of 
abiding by the limit itself rather than getting beyond it immediately. Of course, it does not mean 
affirming the limit itself without reserve. It means experiencing the limit thoroughly. 
 As noted, it is a  'bridge' that enables us to go beyond the limit. More accurately, the 
 `bridge' represents the operation of mediation itself. We would feel uncomfortable to encounter 
the other, who we cannot recognize easily. We would probably feel like removing our attention 
from such a person. To put it in an extreme, we might pass him or her without notice. What is 
most difficult for us is not extending hospitality to that person, but merely noticing and 
acknowledging him or her. This acknowledgement is presupposed by hospitality, which Weil's 
 `attention' reveals. We have already talked to the man described previously when we find the 
 `relation' in a limit situation. In this sense, we are not observers but agents. 
 The preceding argument is related to the reading of the limits. The discussion in the next 
section returns to the argument about the distinction between limits and limitations in Beyond the
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Self. 
 II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIMITS AND LIMITATIONS IN BEYOND THE 
SELF 
Both the limits and limitations discussed in Beyond the  Self cannot be considered without 
language. Although they cannot be regarded identically as the limit or limit situation described 
above in the light of Weil's thought, the experience of the limits of language is certain to be 
included in her thought. It is often described as an exercise of intellect in the limit situation. 
 Reviewing the argument about this point in Beyond the Self. In chapter six in this book, for 
example,  'positivism, scientism, the prevailing idea of the human subject, and the preoccupation 
with the ideal of autonomy' are assessed as  'the interrelation of four mistaken views' (Standish, 
1992, p.  222). These limitations are described as what prevent us from going beyond. On the 
other hand, the limits of language are described as being able to have a positive sense. It is this 
point that I believe is worth careful review. 
 Whether these limits are also something we must confront and overcome, as in the case of 
limitations, or something that we should abide by, is the theme of this discussion. The attitude 
toward the limit situation in Weil shows the positive sense of abiding by the existing limits. 
Added to this, it is apparently very difficult to separate the limits clearly from the limitations. 
This difficulty is related to the two opposing ways of thinking: the  'rational-assertive' and the 
 `receptive-responsive' (p. 19). 
 Another  interpretation of this framework is discussed in the next section. It is related to 
revelation of the attitude of  'waiting' that Weil presents along with the concept of  'attention'. 
III. BEYOND DUALISM: REMAINING IN RELATION WITH  'ATTENTION' 
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to separate the limits from the limitations clearly. That 
assessment can also apply to the distinction between the  'rational-assertive' and the  'receptive-
responsive'. This framework might be effective for revealing problems in present-day life, but 
it is also the fact that there is something obscured by it. The same can be said of the distinction 
between the self-regarding and the other-regarding ways of thinking, which is often discussed 
today, especially in the study of ethics. 
 The self-regarding thought perhaps can be considered as the target of criticism in Beyond the 
Self Needless to say, Weil condemns this kind of egocentricity, too. However, the other-
regarding thought does not necessarily connect with the attitude found in the concept of 
 `attention' or the virtue of humility. To abide by the existing limits is regarded as neither self-
regarding nor other-regarding. It is intermediate of these two. Although definitely different from 
benefitting the self, to abide by the existing limits also differs from benefitting the other directly. 
Weil abides there because she wants to do so purely for herself; otherwise, she is regarded as 
much too passive. Although this view certainly includes the danger of getting into the faith in 
autonomy in a negative sense, it remains worthy of consideration. The pureness of  'attention' is
    120 H. Ikeda 
sustained with the awareness of limits pertaining to the self and with the will to fulfill the duty 
to the self. Georges Bataille (1897-1962) once describes Weil's thoughts and her life as the will 
devoted to  ` inanite' (inanity) (Bataille,  1971)  `. Perhaps the phrase of  ` inanite' here represents 
Bataille's contradictory feelings for Weil as a certain irony. However, it would be lapidary in so 
far as it does not mean incurable pessimism. Weil's devotion to inanity, which Bataille describes, 
shows the abandonment of the idea of perspective. In other words, Weil intends to annihilate the 
self as a centre of individual perspectives, which dominate the  modern world. Such kind of self 
would assert itself beyond all limits and try to control and possess everything. It is exactly the 
same image as the autonomy criticized in Beyond the Self 
 To the contrary, the self, to which Weil attempts to fulfil her duty, is not the personal but the 
impersonal. She ventures to render up the personal to the impersonal. Her criticism against 
personalism reflects this. Weil holds that humility is abhorrent to the nature of human beings. It 
is the only  'supernatural virtue' (i.e., consent to accept inanity and the nothing). It is made 
possible by directing our  'attention' to the limits: thus, it is not solely passive, but abides by 
one's position persistently and tenaciously. In other words, it is  'nothing' that calls us to commit 
ourselves to the other. This attitude can also be deeply related to the virtue of humility and the 
concept of receptiveness in Beyond the Self. 
IV. TOWARD THE DISCUSSION ABOUT ORDINARINESS AND CREATIVITY OF 
 `ATTENTION' 
In closing, I present certain perspective to consider about the ordinariness and creativity of 
 `attention'. It also has to do with considering the relation between the concepts of 
extraordinariness and ordinariness. 
 As mentioned in the last section,  'attention' is not and should not be an ability that only 
special people, such as saints, licensed for.  'Attention' occurs in extremely ordinary situations 
that we cannot acknowledge without experiencing it, whereas it is an extraordinary ability 
because it can see what cannot be seen inherently. Only when the extraordinariness of 
 `attention' is ordinary, can we acknowledge the experience that  'attention' brings. 
 This relation between the concept of extraordinariness and ordinariness represents the 
creativity of  'attention'. Its creativity does not depend upon the function that makes something 
from nothing, but upon the process that returns to the self after undergoing collapse of self-
evidence. It does not show either self-regarding moral or other-regarding moral. 
 `Attention' makes us the stranger.  ` Je' (I) is, so to speak, the most unfamiliar for each of us 
as an individual. Wondering about this kind of  Ve' or the self never leads us to egocentrism, but 
to the other, which is the source of creativity for us. 
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